Les décisions absurdes II (in french)

Ten years after the first volume, Christian Morel goes even further in his analysis of “dramatic and persistent errors.” He relies primarily on examples drawn from high-reliability organizations, a term which refers to organizations, such as nuclear submarines, aircraft carriers or surgical units, which have very few accidents, despite the high level of risk inherent to their activities. The organizations often learned from dramatic accidents to adopt principles which transformed them into extremely reliable systems.
From the analysis of HRO practices, the author identifies key points that can be transposed to organizations hoping to improve their safety management. These recommendations are particularly useful for systems which have reached the technical limits of risk prevention and which must progress henceforth on the human dimension. Indeed, major strides can be made by addressing avoidable human error, such as pilots forgetting to drop the landing gear, or surgeons confusing right and left on the operating table.

An enthralling book, which sensitive people should not read on a plane!